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ABSTRACT: The purpose of the present investigation is to provide a short overview of the main 
implications arising from carrying related parties transactions: accounting reporting (related party 
disclosures – IAS 24), auditing (audit procedures for related party transactions), taxation (issues 
regarding the transfer prices used for intra-group transactions). Although this research does not 
identify  a  problem  with  the  scope  to  solve  it  however  the  utility  might  be  observed  by  its 
contribution  to  the  future  developments,  by  providing  premises  for  forthcoming  studies  in  the 
“related party transactions” field. 
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The role of transnational companies in the world economy has grown significantly in recent 
decades. This situation is due to globalization and partly reflects the trend of national economies 
integration and the technological progress. As a result of multinationals expansion, the intra-group 
commercial transactions have significantly increased (the UNCTAD report from 2003 shows that 
more than 60% of international trade took place within multinationals). 
Related  party  relationships  are  a  normal  feature  of  business,  because  many  entities 
frequently  carry  on  their  activities  through  subsidiaries,  joint  ventures  and  associates.  In  such 
circumstances, an entity is able to influence financial and operating policies of the entity which has 
invested in, through control, joint control or significant influence. Relationship with related parties 
may have significant effects on the result and financial position of an entity because the parties can 
enter  into transactions that independent entities  would  not be. Moreover, financial position and 
results of an entity may be affected by the mere existence of related parties, even if there are no 
transactions between them. Therefore, knowledge of transactions, outstanding balances, including 
commitments  and  relationships  with  related  parties  can  affect  the  way  in  which  the  financial 
statement  users  might  assess  the  performance,  financial  position,  risks  and  opportunities  of  an 
entity. 
The  related  party  transactions  are very  important  for  a  company,  as  they  have  a  lot  of 
implications in various fields, such us: accounting reporting, auditing, tax compliance, strategic 
management, corporate governance etc. This paper is aiming to provide an overview about the first 
three fields mentioned above. We choose to analyze these fields (i.e. accounting, audit, tax) as they 
are  external  factors  -  rules  provided  by  competent  authorities  -  with  important  influence  for 
multinationals activity. A company does not have any capacity to control the accounting, audit and 
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The  purpose  of  the  present  investigation  is  to  provide  a  short  overview  of  the  main 
implications arising from carrying related parties transactions: accounting reporting (related party 
disclosures – IAS 24), auditing (audit procedures for related party transactions), taxation (issues 
regarding the transfer pricing used for intra-group transactions). We choose to discuss about these 
three  fields  as  they  are  external  factors  (rules  provided  by  competent  authorities)  with  high 
influence for multinationals activity. We used in this paper the fundamental research type and we 
applied the deductive research method (meaning that general conclusions were extracted based on 
available  data).  As  investigation  techniques,  we  used  the  literature  research;  analysis  of 
international regulations/law in accounting, audit, taxation; logical analysis.  
Although this investigation does not identify a problem with the scope to solve it however 
the utility might be observed in its contribution to the future developments, by providing premises 




A related party transaction  is defined  by International  Accounting Standard (IAS) 24 as 
follows: “a transfer of resources, services, or obligations between related parties, regardless of 
whether a price is charged”, and two or more parties are considered to be related if one of them has 
the ability to control, joint control or to exercise significant influence over the other one in making 
operational or financial decisions. 
By conducting a literature review, Chen-Wen et. Chinsun (2010) have found out that related 
party transactions are  broadly defined  in two ways, as described  hereinafter. Thus, generically, 
related party transactions are defined as transactions between a company and its related entities 
(e.g., affiliates, subsidiaries, principal owners, directors, officers). Then, related-party transactions 
are defined by Young (2005) as “transactions between a company and an insider, which have been 
the subject of  heightened  scrutiny  from  investors and the  financial  media since the collapse of 
Enron in late 2001”. In a paper about the techniques used for auditing related party transactions 
Gordon et al. (2007) state that related party definition varies across regulatory bodies. Furthermore, 
they  consider  that  related  party  transactions  ought  to  be  assessed  in  the  overall  context  of  a 
company’s governance structure, where the managements’ assertions regarding the existence and 
the nature of such transactions should play a determinant role. 
In the opinion of Coase (1937), related party transactions between group members might be 
cost-effective, due to two main reasons: they help in reducing transaction costs and enhance the 
enforcement of contracts and property rights. However, the principal owners and/or main directors 
might abuse from such related flows by using them for opportunistic purposes. A relevant example 
is when transactions are carried out at a different price than the market one and the profits are then 
shifted  among  group  members,  while  the  consolidated  earnings  remain  generally  unaffected 
(Thomas et al., 2004).  Gordon et al. (2007) considered that related party transactions represent a 
normal  part  of  the  business  and  the  fact  that  firms  are  conducting  a  high  volume  of  such 
transactions should not automatically lead to the conclusion that they hide accounting and financial 
fraud. 
According to literature review, the papers regarding transfer pricing generally deals with the 
following main topics: tax accounting papers studying the degree to which differentials between 
national  tax  rates  lead  to  income  shifting  and  transfer  pricing  manipulation  (Klassen,  Lang, 
Wolfson, 1993; Harris, 1993; Iacob, 1996; Swenson, 2001; Gupta, Mills, 2002); fiscal rules as one 
of the environmental factors that influence the group’s transfer pricing policy (Emmanuel, Mehafdi, Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
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1994;  Cravens,  Shearon,  1996;  Cravens,  1997);  optimal  transfer  pricing  method  from  a  tax 
perspective  (Swenson,  2001;  Van  Mens,  Porquet,  2001;  Douvier,  2005);  the  possibilities  to 
maximize the firm’s value through the transfer pricing strategy (Michaels, 2005). There are a lot of 
papers investigating the relationship between company performance and related party transactions 
(Igor et al., 2001; Grosfeld and Tressel, 2002; Ming and Wong, 2003; Young, 2005; Bennedsen et 
al., 2007). Gordon et al (2004a) and Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2004) conclude that a weak corporate 
governance leads to more related party transactions. 
Generally, in the scientific literature on the related party transactions topic, two theories 
predominate,  as  follows:  (a)  conflict  of  interests:  in  this  case  the  transactions  are  viewed  as 
potentially  harmful  and  they  are  thought  to  be  carried  out  in  the  executives  interest  (with  the 
purpose to expropriate wealth from shareholders) - Jian and Wong (2008); Aharony et al. (2005), 
Kohlbeck  and  Mayhew  (2004)  etc;  (b)  efficient  transaction:  related  party  transactions  are 




The general reporting framework of related party transactions is set out by IAS 24. Related 
party transactions can take a variety of forms. Many of them include transactions in the normal 
course of business, for example, purchases or sales of goods at market values. However, others can 
include significant one-off transactions that may be at a fair value on an arm's length basis or that 
may be at book value or some other amount that differs from market prices. The stated objective of 
IAS 24, “Related party disclosures”, is to ensure that “financial statements contain the disclosures 
necessary to draw attention to the possibility that the reported financial position and results may 
have been affected by the existence of related parties, transactions or outstanding balances with 
such parties” (IAS 24 par 1). 
Most related party transactions are carried out in the normal course of an entity's business, 
but companies do also sometimes act improperly or illegally through the medium of related parties 
(this is particularly in those circumstances when disclosure is important). Of course, it would be 
naive to think that an entity that indulged in improper or illegal activities would willingly disclose 
the fact. The disclosure requirements of IAS 24 cannot prevent illegal actions or fraud. However, 
the existence of rules in the standard gives authority to both employees involved in preparing the 
financial statements, and to auditors, to resist any suppression of disclosure. In addition, regulators 
and other authorities are able to use the standard's provisions when investigating and punishing any 
illegality revealed. 
IAS 24 is a disclosure standard. It sets out how related party relationships, transactions and 
balances should be identified and what disclosures should be made, and when. (IAS 24 par 2). The 
standard requires disclosure of related party transactions and balances in the individual financial 
statements of parent companies and subsidiaries. This means that intra-group transactions between 
such entities are disclosed, although generally such disclosures are likely to be aggregated by type 
because of their large volume. For instance, a subsidiary would usually disclose aggregate sales to, 
and aggregate purchases from, its parent. On consolidation, however, such transactions would be 
eliminated and would, therefore, not be disclosed in the consolidated financial statements (IAS 24 
par 3, 4). 
The standard also requires that related party relationship, transactions and balances between 
a venturer, an investor in a joint venture or an associate and its joint venture or associate to be 
disclosed in the individual financial statements of both the investor and associate (IAS 24 par 3). As 
such, transactions and balances that are not eliminated on consolidation would also be disclosed in 
any consolidated financial statements produced by the investor. 
There are no exemptions from disclosure of intra-group transactions for subsidiaries, or for 
parent  companies  that  produce  consolidated  financial  statements  with  their  individual  financial Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
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statements. Nor is there any “confidentiality” exemption, even in the situation where an entity has a 
duty of confidentiality imposed by law. In relation to intra-group transactions between parents and 
subsidiaries,  the  IASB  has  stated  that  disclosure  of  related  party  transactions  and  balances  is 
essential information for external parties who need to be aware of the level of support provided by 
related parties (IAS 24 par BC11). Many subsidiaries, for example, depend on financial support 
from their parents and those who advance credit to such subsidiaries should to be aware of the level 
of support available from the parent or of the lack of such support. 
 
Auditing overview 
The related party transactions audit represents an important part of a financial statements 
audit. The detection of related parties and related party transactions as well are between the most 
important and difficult issues of a financial statements audit. This part of an audit is fateful because 
of the following reasons: (i) the demand under generally accepted accounting standards to present 
material related party transactions and particular control relationships; (ii) the possibility to distort 
or mislead the financial statements in the lack of appropriate disclosure; and (iii) the evidences of 
fraudulent  financial reporting and/or  misappropriation of assets which were encouraged, among 
others, by the existence of undisclosed related parties. The undisclosed related parties are important 
tools for unscrupulous persons. Related parties, such as affiliated entities, controlling shareholders 
or general management may perform transactions that improperly grow earnings by distorting their 
economic substance or mask financial results through lack of disclosure, or may even fraud the 
company by transferring funds to other related parties. 
Related party transactions have been playing an important role in auditing in the latest years. 
From an auditor’s point of view, related-party transactions bear two different, but not necessary 
exclusive, implications: appropriate disclosure and fraud detection. In certain situations, related-
party transactions might be the direct result of an affiliation/controlling relationship, as in the lack 
of such relationship, the dealings might not have occurred at all or might have had substantially 
different  conditions.  In  such  circumstances,  disclosure  regarding  the  amount  and  the  nature  of 
related  party  transactions  is  necessary  for  a  suitable  understanding  of  the  financial  statements. 
Inappropriate disclosure of transactions with related parties might have as a result the misleading of 
the  financial  statements and this  is way the auditor should  be concerned with  identifying such 
transactions during the audit process and evaluating the veracity of their disclosure. 
The  general  framework  regarding  the  responsibilities  of  the  auditor  with  respect  to  the 
related party relationships and transactions during a financial statements audit is provided by the 
International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 550 “Related parties”. According to its provisions, the 
auditor has the responsibility to perform “audit procedures to identify, assess and respond to the 
risks of material misstatement arising from the entity’s failure to appropriately accounting for or 
disclose related party relationships, transactions or balances in accordance with the requirements of 
the financial reporting framework basis on which the reporting statements are performed” (ISA 550, 
par 3). The auditor has to achieve a proper understanding of an entity’s related party relationship 
and transactions in each auditing process, even in the cases when the applicable financial reporting 
framework requires minimal or no related party disclosures, as the auditor needs to be able to assess 
whether the financial statements are affected by those relationships and transactions (ISA 550 par 
4). 
Where there is observed a material misstatement of the financial statements that belong to 
the  non-disclosure  of  information,  the  auditor  is  guided  by  the  requirements  of  ISA  705, 
“Modifications to the opinion in the independent auditor’s report”, which is applicable for periods 
starting  on  or  after  15  December  2009.  Paragraph  19  of  ISA  705  states  that  where  such 
circumstances arise, the auditor should: (i) “discuss the non-disclosure with those charged with 
governance;  (ii)  describe  in  the  basis  for  modification  paragraph  the  nature  of  the  omitted 
information;  and  (iii)  unless  prohibited  by  law  or  regulation  include  the  omitted  disclosures Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
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provided it is practicable to do so and the auditor has obtained sufficient appropriate audit evidence 
about the omitted information” (ISA 705 par 19). 
The previous auditing standard, for periods starting prior to 15 December 2009, did not 
require the auditor to include the missing disclosures where appropriate. This means that for periods 
starting on or after 15 December 2009 audit opinions might include the omitted disclosures where 
previously the auditor simply gave a qualified opinion and stated the company’s failure to disclose 
the information. 
The ISA’s application guidance describes circumstances where it would not be appropriate 
to  disclose  the  omitted  information  as  follows:  “(i)  the  disclosures  have  not  been  prepared  by 
management or the disclosures are otherwise  not readily available to the auditor; or (ii)  in the 
auditor’s judgment the disclosures would be unduly voluminous in relation to the auditor’s report.” 




From a fiscal point of view the related party transactions present importance due to the 
transfer prices involved. In the cases when one part of a transnational company situated  in one 
country transfers (meaning that it sells) goods, services or know-how to another part situated in a 
different  country,  the  price  paid  for  these  goods  or  services  is  called  “transfer  price”.  This  is 
considered as the price charged in commercial dealings (whether for tangible property, intellectual 
property or services provision) carried on between companies under control/affiliation relationship 
(Abdallah, 2004) and is often an important component used for performance assessing within large 
divided companies (Langfield-Smith, Smith, 2005). 
Transfer pricing is one of the most challenging and frequently least understood tool of a 
transnational  company.  In  unrelated  party  transactions,  the  independent  market  forces  set  the 
commercial pricing of goods, intangibles or services transacted between them. However, due to the 
lack of independence belonging to the commercial and financial transactions carried on between 
related  parties,  there  is  the  possibility  of  setting  transfer  prices  that  deviate  from  independent 
commercial prices.  
As a consequence, this might result in the distortion of profits and tax liabilities as well in 
case of each related entity. When the related entities are situated in different fiscal jurisdictions, the 
potential distortion of profits and tax liabilities involves a greater concern, due to the fact that the 
difference in taxation level might lead to the possibility of not paying the fair share of tax in certain 
jurisdictions, while the group as a whole can benefit from a tax advantage.  
Thus, transfer pricing might be just an arbitrary figure, meaning by this that it could be 
unrelated to costs incurred, to operations carried out or to added value. The transfer prices might be 
shaped  at  a  level  which  reduces  or  even  cancels  out  the  total  tax  that  has  to  be  paid  by  the 
transnational organisation in certain tax jurisdictions.  
Based on the above, we can conclude that the growth of multinationals bear increasingly 
complex taxation aspects for both companies and tax administrations, since different country rules 
for the company taxation cannot be view in isolation, but must be analyzed in a broad international 
context.  These  issues  arise  from  the  practical  difficulty  for  both  multinationals  and  tax 
administration to determine the revenues and expenses of a company that is part of a transnational 
group that should be taken into account within a fiscal jurisdiction, particularly where the group’s 
operations are highly integrated.  
In  the  case  of  multinationals,  the  need  to  comply  with  regulations  and  administrative 
requirements  that  might  differ  from  country  to country  involves  additional  problems.  Different 
requirements might lead to a greater burden on a company and result in higher cost compliance than 
for a similar firm operating only within a single tax jurisdiction.  Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
  246 
For tax administration, specific problems may arise at both policy and practical level. At a 
policy level, countries have to reconcile their legitimate right to tax profits of a taxpayer based upon 
revenues and expenses that might be reasonably considered arising within their territory with the 
necessity to avoid the taxation of the same piece of income by more than one tax jurisdiction. Such 
double  or  multiple  taxation  might  create  an  impediment  to  cross-border  transactions  of  goods, 
services and capital movement. At a practical level, a country’s determination of such revenues and 
expenses allocation could be impeded by difficulties in obtaining pertinent data located outside its 
own jurisdiction.     
Thus, in a global economy where multinationals play a prominent role, governments should 
ensure that the taxable profits of such an entity are not artificially shifted out of their country and 
that the tax  base  reported  by  multinationals within  their  jurisdiction  reflects  the  real  economic 
activity  performed  therein.  This  is  way  the  tax  authorities  in  the  US  and  a  handful  of  others 
countries has started to pay considerable attention to transfer pricing early before, in the 1960 and 
1970. As part of their general remit OECD member countries recognised that it would be helpful to 
provide some general guidance on transfer pricing in order to avoid the damaging effect that double 
taxation would have on international trade. The result was the OECD report and Guidelines of 
transfer pricing which were first issued in 1979 and were subsequently revised and updated in 1995 
and again in 2010. 
The  OECD  Guidelines  for  transfer  pricing  provides  “the  arm’s  length  principle”  as  the 
standard  to  guide  transfer  pricing.  Currently,  the  arm’s  length  principle  is  the  internationally 
accepted standard adopted by the OECD’s member countries and many non-member countries as 
well.  
The arm’s length principle is defined in paragraph 1 of Article 9 (Associated Enterprises) of 
the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital as presented below: “Where conditions 
are made or imposed between two affiliated enterprises in their commercial or financial relations 
which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits 
which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of 
those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed 
accordingly.”  
Article 7 “Business Profits” of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital 
provides under paragraph 2 that when the profits are attributed to a permanent establishment, that 
permanent establishment should be considered as “a distinct and separate enterprise engaged in the 
same or similar activities and under the same or similar conditions”. These provisions correspond to 
the  application  of  the  arm’s  length  principle  defined  in  paragraph  1  of  Article  9  “Associated 
Enterprises” of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital.  
According to the arm’s length principle, the transactions between related parties should be 
performed  under  comparable  conditions  and  circumstances as  the  transaction  with  independent 
parties. This principle is based on the hypothesis that whether the terms and conditions agreed in an 
independent party transaction are driven by the market forces, the pricing of the transaction would 
reflect  the  real  economic  value  of  the  contribution  of  each  entity  involved  in  the  transaction. 
Shortly, this means that whether two related parties obtain profits at levels above or below the 
comparable  market  level  just  due  to the  special  relationship  between  them,  the  profits  will  be 
considered as  non-arm’s  length. In such a situation, tax  authorities that enact the arm’s  length 
principle are allowed to make all the needed adjustments to the taxable profits of the related parties 
in their countries with the scope to reflect the real value that would be derived on an arm’s length 
basis. 
Hereby, by applying the arm’s length principle, the related and the independent party dealings 
would be treated equally for tax purposes and hence the creation of tax advantages or disadvantages 
would be avoid (otherwise the relative competitive positions of each entity would be distort). Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 13(2), 2011 
  247 
However  the  application  of  the  arm’s  length  principle  is  not  simple  and  it  involves  certain 
difficulties. For instance, there are cases of complicated and unique business structures or arrangements 
that might be rarely encountered between independent entities. The lack of comparable circumstances 
incurred  between  independent  parties  leads  to  a  difficult  application  of  the  arm’s  length  principle. 
Moreover,  in  order  to  establish  the  arm’s  length  principle,  there  would  be  sometimes  necessary 
substantial analysis of large volumes of data and information (in addition, there are cases when certain 
information  might  not  even  be  readily  available  or  might  be  confidential  and  cannot  be  disclosed 
without  revealing  business  secrets).  Furthermore,  the  taxpayers  could  be  obliged  to  bear  additional 
burdens in order to perform such comprehensive analyses for applying the arm’s length principle and 
preparing sufficient documentation needed to demonstrate compliance with the arm’s length principle. 
Nevertheless, the  multinationals should carefully treat the transfer pricing  issues and should 
ensure they hold a proper and detailed documentation of transfer prices used, as it is vital for every entity 
to hold a coherent and defendable transfer pricing policy, which is responsive to the very real climate 
of change in which they are operating. As cross border intra-group transactions are growing rapidly 
and becoming more and more complex, the tax authorities worldwide become more vigilant. Thus, 
currently  they  are  imposing  stricter  penalties  and  new  documentation  requirements  and  are 
engaging in increased information exchanges and increased tax audit/tax inspection processes, as 
they  become  aware  of  how  transfer  pricing  might  affect  tax  incomes.  By  considering  transfer 
pricing  practices  carefully,  multinational  groups  have  the  possibility  to  manage  risk  while 
improving operational and financial performance based on a long-term view of sustainable growth. 
 
Conclusions 
As  the  economy  globalize,  the  numerous  processes  in  the  research  and  development, 
manufacture,  sale  and  distribution  of  goods or services  increasingly  are  performed  by  separate 
entities within a multinational group and the flow of products and services through intercompany 
transactions frequently involves two or more countries. In these circumstances, the related party 
transactions become very important for a company, all the more so as they bear a lot of implications 
in various fields.  
Generally, in the scientific literature on the related party transactions topic, two theories 
predominate,  as  follows:  (a)  conflict  of  interests:  in  this  case  the  transactions  are  viewed  as 
potentially  harmful  and  they  are  thought  to  be  carried  out  in  the  executives  interest  (with  the 
purpose to expropriate wealth from shareholders) - Jian and Wong (2008); Aharony et al. (2005), 
Kohlbeck  and  Mayhew  (2004)  etc;  (b)  efficient  transaction:  related  party  transactions  are 
considered profitable economic deals - Gordon et al. (2004 a, b). 
An important issue arising from carrying out related party transaction is represented by the 
transfer prices involved in such dealings. These prices are not the subject of an exact science and, 
consequently,  their  determination  is  a  subjective  issue,  which  can  give  rise  to  different 
interpretations.  The  transfer  pricing  assessment  is  a  laborious  process  which  requires  tax  and 
accounting knowledge and also needs information from various economic fields that may influence 
their level. Such information is about: a very good knowledge of the goods/services traded, of the 
production process of these goods/services, of the market etc. 
By using the fundamental research type, this paper provided a short overview of accounting, 
auditing and taxation aspects borne by the related party transactions. As it is presented above, those 
are complex fields involving specific and different burdens in a company’s account. Consequently, 
the firms carrying out related party transaction must be aware of these provisions in order to ensure 
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